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Abstract  
The town of Owerri was inadvertently so important to the Federal and Biafran forces during the civil war so 
much so that the battle of Owerri has been acknowledged as one of deadliest in the civil war. This was evident in 
the way the town changed hands between the Federal and the Biafran forces as many as three times. While the 
Biafran forces saw Owerri as the last major town under their control, they believed that its effective defence 
would go a long way to ensure the safety of the Uli airport. They were therefore ready to defend it to the last 
man. The Federal army on the other hand though initially did not consider the town important but when they 
were committed to attack the town by Colonel Adekunle, they saw it as the key that held their victory. They 
hoped also to enter Uli, where the last major airstrip under Biafran control was cited, through Owerri to prevent 
ColonelOjukwu from escaping. They therefore fought with vigour. The study reveals that the Federal 3
rd
 Marine 
Commando Division which almost conveniently overwhelmed the Biafra forces in the South East met its 
waterloo at Owerri and this led to removal and replacement of its commander. It further reveals that the 
recapture of Owerri by the Biafran forces reinvigorated the already waning fighting spirit of the Biafran army. It 
concludes that the recapture of Owerri by the Federal forces gave a fatal and irrecoverable blow on the strength 
of the Biafran army hence the Republic of Biafra ceased to exist barely five days after the conquest of Owerri. 
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Introduction 
From the ancient times war has been one of the activities of man and its consequences such as starvation and 
death are succinctly clear to all combatants. Still absolute avoidance of war has been impossible both in 
developed and in developing countries. War therefore has become a form of relationship between and as well as 
among people. In the case of Nigeria, due to the coup of January 15, and the counter coup of July, 29 1966 and 
the reactions that followed them, the only form of relationship which the people of Eastern Nigeria wanted to 
have with other Nigerians within that period, especially the Northern Nigerians was war and vice versa.
1
The 
anticipated war came and was waged between 1967 and 1970.  
The war came when the East seceded and called itself the Republic of Biafra. The Federal Government needed 
nothing but to bring the people of the former Eastern Nigeria back to the Nigerian fold and the only option 
available after all pacification measures failed was war. The Federal military government drew a war plan of 
crushing Enugu, the capital city of the secessionist regime within a month so as to harry it in jettisoning the idea 
of secession and return to the statusquo. To create a favourable environment for the easy capture of Enugu, the 
Federal government came up with what she called operation UNICORD (a code name for the police action) 
which was a war plans to capture Obudu, Ogoja, Garkem and Nsukka.
2
 
Another strategy was to conquer the water ways to effectively deny Biafra from receiving logistics for 
prosecuting the war. As a result, the Third Marine Commando (3MCDO) commanded by Col. Benjamin 
Adekunle was charged with the responsibility of capturing Bonny, Calabar, Opobo and Port Harcourt.
3
 
Sequel to this, 1 Area Command with Headquarters in Kaduna was to be the fighting force, 2 Area Command in 
Ibadan was for internal security, 4 Area Command in Benin was to defend Mid-west and Lagos Garrison 
Organization from where 3MCDO was created was to defend the capital city, Lagos. Later, 1 Area Command 
moved its headquarters to Markurdi in preparation for action against Biafra. In addition, mobilization of ex-
service men began leading to the formation of 4 battalions: 20, 21, 22 and 23.
4
 
As a result formed 2 infantry battalions: 7 battalion based in Enugu was to defend the North while 8 battalion 
based in Port Harcourt was to defend the South while the 1 battalion was to be in reserve with the additional task 
of defending the Niger river to the west. Later, 2 additional battalions under 52 brigade comprising 8 and 9 
battalions commanded by Colonels Alexander Madiebo and Eze
5
 respectively were created. 
The Biafran deployment was a follows: 7 battalion at Nsukka with A Company at Okuta was responsible for 80 
miles Okuta- Onitsha stretch; B Company responsible for 30 miles stretch covering Okuta to Obolo-Eke; C 
Company was responsible for the defence of communication lines and a platoon at Eha-Amufu. 8 Battalion was 
moved to Port Harcourt in the south with one company each at Ahoada, Calabar, Oron and a platoon at Bonny.
6 
Historical Research Letter                                                                                                                                      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3178 (Paper)  ISSN 2225-0964 (Online) 
Vol 9, 2014 
 
26 
The air force acquired 2 old planes B25 and B26 bomber and 3 helicopters fitted with machine guns and the 
navy had some make-shift patrol boats and a ship NNS Ibadan 
7
which had been on eastern patrol duties and 
which the senior officer Eastern patrol, Lt. Cdr. Anuku, now a Biafran, refused to return to Lagos.
8
 
More so, due to acute shortage of logistics for the army training, young men and women who were determined to 
fight but could not find their way into the army on the Biafran side formed some organizations known as the 
militia. With the help of some ex-service men, individuals were trained in the use of whatever weapons available 
to individuals. Biafra also created what she called BiafranOrganisation of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) and their 
duty was to reinforce the regular troops if need be, assist in rear administration, garrison a captured area, 
educating the people why Biafra was fighting and to also infiltrate the Nigerian line for sabotage, espionage 
andintelligence activity.
9
 On the Nigeria side, mobilization of ex - service men was ordered by the Commander - 
in – Chief General Yakubu Gowon.  Increased recruitment from the personnel of the Nigerian Police Force and 
even Local Government was embarked upon.  The civilians were trained in civil defense duties
10
.  
 
Source: http://www.mapzones.com “Map of Owerri” (assessed 18/12/2013) 
 Star in green colour was where 16 Brigade led by Lt. Col. Utuk was encircled  
Plans and Operations 
The battle of Owerri was particularly important to the Federal army as Owerri was one of the last towns Colonel 
Adekunle, the commander of the Third Marine Commando (3MCDO) believed that when conquered, the capture 
of General Ojukwu, the Biafran Head of State, would be a matter of days and its concomitant, the capitulation of 
Biafra. The Federal army also hoped to enter the airstrip at Uli through Owerri to make Ojukwu’s escape 
impossible.Uli-Ihiala had been identified as Biafra’s new centre of gravity.11 To the Biafran army,Owerri was 
one of the last towns that must be defended if her claim of sovereignty must be maintained. Hence the frequent 
change of hands in Owerri between the Federal and the Biafran army as many as three times. 
The Third Marine Commando (3MCDO) which the onus of the capturing of Owerri eventually fell on was one 
of the three Divisions of the Nigerian army. The troop strength of the Divisionat some point in course of the war 
was between 35,000 and 40,000.
12
 According to Colonel Adekunle, “the Division was created from scratch, from 
street thugs, outlaws and renegades…which he molded into a credible force.13 To the men and officers of the 
3MCDO, the fear of Colonel Adekunle often outweighed fear of the enemy.
14
 
It was the capture of Port Harcourt on the 18
th
 May, 1968
15
 that boosted the prestige and reputation of the 
3MCDO and made Colonel Adekunle think of entering Owerri. The capture of Owerri was not in the initial 
assignment of the 3MCDO. The assignment given to Adekunle’s Division was the liberation of Uyo, Annang 
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and Aba while Owerri lay in the 2 Division operational areas.
16
However after the conquest of Port Harcourt by 
the Federal troops, the commander of the 3MCDO Colonel Adekunle went to Lagos on Tuesday, May 21
st
, 
1968and granted interview to the world press where upon he was asked the next target of the wonderful 3MCDO 
and he answered that he would capture and give Owerri, Aba and Umuahia (OAU) as Independence Day, 
October 1
st
 1968 celebration gift, to General Gowon and the people of Nigeria.
17
 To achieve this objective, the 
3MCDO was divided into 4 sectors. Sector 1 was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Godwin Ally comprised of 
15 and 16 Brigade, 2 Sector by Lt. Colonel Akinrinade comprised of 14 and 17 Brigade, 3 Sector by Lt Col. 
AlabiIsama, comprised of 12 Brigade, 13 Brigade and 18 Brigade and 4 Sector by Ayo Ariyo.
18
 15 Brigade, 
under Major YemiAlabi (and later by Major Makanjuola) and 16 Brigade commanded by Major Utuk were 
tasked to conquer Owerri. 12 Brigade under Captain Isemede and 17 Brigade under Philemon Shande were given 
the responsibility to conquer Aba. 13 Brigade commanded by Major Tuoyo and 18 Brigade under Major Aliyu 
were given the task of capturing Umuahia. 14 Brigade commanded by Major George Innih was to provide the 
link between Owerri and Aba.
19
 
The capture and recapture ofOwerriby both forces was so confusing that it made the hitherto optimistic 
government spokesmen in Lagos, to become increasing circumspect about predicting the date for victory, and 
confined themselves to “we are confident that the war will end this year”.20The Biafran forces, unlike in some 
other sectors of the war, were now also on the offensive instead of the usual defensive battle. At Owerri, the war 
became dogged and dirtier. 
21
 
The fall of Owerriin 1968 came after the Biafran troops successfully drove the Federal army out of Oguta
22
which 
was undertaken by the Biafran 14 division.  The battle of Owerri/Oguta fell under the domain of 1 Sector of the 
3MCDO commanded by Lt. Col. Godwin Ally which included a Special Force under AliyuAbubarkar, 14 
Brigade commanded by  Eromobor and later by George Innih and 16 Brigade commanded by Major 
Utuk.
23
Oguta was attacked as part of the left flank of Owerri.  
The attack on Oguta shook the Biafran army because the town was six miles away from Uli Airport, the only 
Biafran link with the outside world.
24
 The Federal forces made several attempts to enter Oguta through Ebocha 
Bridge but each time, were beaten by the Biafran 60 Brigade stationed in the bridge until 9
th
 September, 1968 
when the Federal troops of the 3MCDO entered through Orashi River, and moved to Ezi-Osu
25
and overpowered 
the Biafran Naval Ratings. To make the matter worse, Biafra lacked a formidable force to counter attack the 
3MCDO inside Oguta. As a result, on 12
th
 September, 1968Biafran ColonelAmadi of 11 Division assembled 
some 300 armed infantry men, theBiafran Navy and the Air Force had 100 armed men each and 250 men of 14 
Division. With these troops, the first attempt to clear Oguta by 0900 hours of 12
th
 September, 1968 began and 
was commanded by Navy Captain Fred Anuku, the Biafran Chief of Naval Staff, Colonels Nwajei and Achuzia 
and General Ojukwuhimself. But they were beaten by the Federal forces.
26
The battle was so frustrating that the 
Biafran Head of State, General Ojukwu, left Oguta for Umuahia and sent to his army commander, Major General 
Alexander Madiebosignaling thus: 
C-in-C for GOC.Oguta operations. Army efforts at Oguta appear fruitless. 
There is no basis for Achuzia’s optimism. Nwajei only hopes while Anuku 
is hopeless. You will take the situation personally in hand and report 
progress. Acknowlege.
27
 
However, at 1700 hours the same day, Achuzia, Nwajei and Anuku launched another offensive with the 
available troops against the Federal forces of 15 Brigade in Oguta led by Major Makanjuola. The attack was very 
successful so much so that by 1845 hours, the Biafran forces had cleared the town completely from the Federal 
forces and the Biafran Naval PC 204 played a leading role in the exercise.
28
 Much equipment and clothing were 
salvaged from the boats the Biafran forces destroyed including a 40mm Bofor anti-aircraft gun and a 
Panhardamoured vehicle which the Biafran nicknamed “Oguta Boy”.29 
After the battle of Oguta,the Biafran troops ran out of ammunition and the Federal troops swiftly took the 
advantage of that andon 13
th
 September 1968, they launched an attack on Obinze, eight miles south of Owerri, 
the headquarters of the Biafran 52 Brigade and 14 Division and disorganized them. They moved their 
headquarters to Owerri but had not effectively reorganized their army when the Federal army attacked Owerri. In 
fact, the report of the attack got to the Biafran army Commander, Major-General Madiebo and the commander of 
14 Division, Col. Nwajei when the Federal forces were still at Awarra but there was little they could do to 
remedy the situation owing to lack of ammunition. Not long, the Federal 16 Brigade commanded by Major Utuk 
(now given field promotion of Lieutenant Colonel)
30
 got to Ohoba town and was pressing to enter Avu and 
Obinze on the outskirt of Owerri. Later they got to Chokocho-Okehi-Okpuala road. Yet, the Biafran forces had 
no answer to the assault. Although the Biafran 63 Brigade led by Major Okilo put some feeble resistance which 
was highly infinitesimal to the Federal fire power and numerical strength. On 17 September 1968 
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therefore,Owerri came under severe attack.
31
The Federal army offensive was preceded by constant air raids by 
the Nigerian Air force so as to degrade the resistance of the Biafran army before the Federal army final assault. 
One of the earliest targets of the air raids was the Biafran state house in Owerri.
32
 In the night of 17
th
 September, 
Owerri saw a heavy artillery bombardment and on Monday, 18
th
  
September, Owerri fell to the Federal army of the 3MCDO and the Biafran 14 Division commander Col. Nwajei 
who achieved great fit in Oguta was relieved of his appointment despite his plea that he lost Owerri not because 
of the will to fight but arms to fight with and was replaced by Brigadier Ogbugo Kalu.
33
 
This operation to capture Owerri, Aba and Umuahia often referred as operation OAU started in September 1968. 
Even before the Oguta /Owerri battle, the 17 Brigade of the 3MCDO under the command of Lt. Col. Philemon 
Shande was ordered to attack Aba. He protested that although his Brigade was ready to fight but obviously not 
sufficiently prepared to attack an Igbo core area where the 3MCDO commanders knew that they would not only 
be fighting the Biafran army but would also fail to elicit the cooperation of the natives which was the major key 
of their successes in Biafran non-Igbo areas. Yet, Colonel Adekunle ordered the attack to take place. Although 
he succeeded in capturing Aba on the 4
th
 of September but he was killed thereafter. Brigadier Alabi-Isama 
described the crisis that followed his death thus:  
Lt .Col. Philemon Shande was a Tiv man from Benue, and more than fifty 
percent of our men were from Benue…there was protest everywhere. Lt. Col. 
Godwin Ally, the new Chief of Staff (from Ogoja) and Lt. Col. Obeya (from 
Benue) had to go round the units to talk to the Benue troops of Benue origin. 
3MCDO was in trouble and it took over two weeks to settle the situation. His 
troops of 17 Brigade withdrew to Obigbo where they started from.
34
 
 In October however, theBiafran forces reorganized and launched a heavy counter attack to recapture Owerri. 
They surrounded the city and then sent troops into the city to have the Nigerian forces flee from the city so as to 
run into the waiting hands of Biafran forces. Thus, on December 21, 1968 the Biafran army surrounded Owerri, 
firing mortars and shells into the city.Meanwhile, the year 1969 started with the transfer on 3 January by Colonel 
Ojukwu of two Brigades of the “S” Division from Aba front under the command of Colonel Onwuatuegwu to 
the Owerri front to help OgbugoKalu and the Fourteenth Division in the siege of Owerri.
35
Thus on January 8, 
1969 the Biafrans gained control of Owerri.
36
 
But on January 12 Col. Benjamin Adekunle ordered another offensive against the Biafrans inside Owerri. 
Although the Biafrans lost the city, they regained it within a few days. They gained control of the main Aba-
Owerri road at Alakwo and Okpuala down to the road between Olakwo and Owerrinta Bridge, near Ugba 
junction and later to Amala.
37
Meanwhile; the Nigerians inside Owerri were trying to push out of the town in all 
directions. They pushed up to Orji Bridge on the  Owerri-Okigwe road  
and from there launched attack on Mbieri and Orodo with the aim of getting to Orlu and Nkwere but they were 
pushed back to Izombe and Obudi.
38
 The Nigerians troops were quickly running out of food and ammunition and 
were constantly being bombarded by the Biafran air force led by Carl Gustaf. By April 1969 the Biafrans had 
driven the Nigerians more than a mile away from Owerri.
39
 
On April 24 the Nigerian 16 Brigade fought their way out of Owerri and made a beeline out of the area. On April 
25 the Biafran 14 Division ambushed the retreating Nigerians killed and captured many of their men. By this 
time most Nigerians had been kicked out of Owerri and on April 26 many more Nigerians surrendered to the 
Biafrans.
40
 Therefore, on 26 April 1969 when the Biafran troops led by BrigadierOgbugoKalu succeeded in 
driving the Federal forces out Owerri for the second time, Biafrans went agog with the news
41
. 
This battle of Owerri and of course the battle of OAU ended in favour of Biafran army, and to a very large 
extent, eclipsed all the hitherto achievements of Col. Adekunle, the commander of 3MCDO.His army 
commanders deserted him and he was solely blamed for the woes that befell the 3MCDO. Even the Army 
Headquarters accused him of being intransigent. For instance, Obasanjo who latter took over the command of 
3MCDO put it his own blame thus: “Adekunle wanted to use the capture of OAU to prepare himself up for any 
future political position or responsibility which he might seek.”42 While to Brigadier Alabi-Isama who was the 
Chief of Staff of the 3MCDO, “what was 3MCDO’s aim of attacking Owerri if not for the ego of its commander 
at play?”43 But it was also probably because Adekunle believed that Biafrans were training people for guerrilla 
warfare in the area and to dislodge the Biafran radio station at Umuahia
44
 which was waging a serious 
psychological warfare against the Federal troops that made him to launch attack on OAU. Adekunle described 
the relationship between him and the Army Headquarters as follows: 
…Lagos did not take too kindly to those glowing reports. The story was that I 
was constructing an aura of ‘invincibility’ around my person. The troops were 
told through clandestine avenues that I was building up an ‘ego’ at their 
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expense….I came to learn that some of my officers were given gifts and 
promised accelerated promotion to work with these Lagos elements…the 
domestic press was warned not to give ‘undue coverage’ to the success of 3rd 
Marine Commando Division and when the Daily Times disregarded the military 
warning, Sam Amuga editor of the paper was shown the way out….To the The 
Economist Magazine, I was a friend who relished using starvation as a weapon 
of war. I expected Lagos to come to the defense of its commander. It did not. 
Rather, Army Headquarters under General Hassan, repeatedly sent damaging 
report to Supreme Headquarters. I was branded an obstinate officer who defied 
orders, an officer who refused to cooperate or implement policy decisions and 
most incomprehensible of all, a grossly ‘ambitious’ officer. The Division was 
accused of being infested with hemp addicts and it was said that I was 
instrumental in this odium….I was accused of bad management and selling arms 
and ammunition to Ojukwu.
45
 
As it is often said, failure is an orphan while success has many fathers. One crucial question would be, at what 
point did Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, A.K.A “Black Scopion” started selling arms and ammunitions to 
Ojukwu? However, no matter what was Adekunle’s reason for attacking OAU against the advice of Lt. Col. 
Philemon Shande and others,
46
instead of the attempt to yield the desired result of giving a crushing blow to the 
Biafran forces, it served as an elixir to the Biafran army because of successes it recorded in that battle. 
The battle was so devastating that on the 7
th
 October, 1968, 6 days after the October 1 anniversary, the 1 Sector 
of commando had lost almost all its troops and weapons
47
and 3MCDO was up in flames.
48
Sequel to the above, 
the 3MCDO became a demoralized fighting force and Adekunle became jittery and was not at his wits end to 
proffer solution on the war situation in that area. 
The Owerri encirclement  
At the end of January 1969, in a conference with Colonel Ojukwu and Brigadier Kalu, Colonel Onwuatuegwu 
proposed that head-on tactics should be abandoned, and what fire-power the Biafrans had should be used to try 
to clear the flanks of Owerri and close the Nigerian supply line. The plan was agreed to, and throughout the 
month of February both commanders cleared the Nigerian occupied villages to the east and west of Owerri, 
finally penetrating in force round to the south of the town. The completion of the encirclement and the final 
cutting off the Nigerian supply came on 28 February.
49
The implication was that 16 brigade of the Federal army 
led by Lt. Col.Utuk that entered Owerri since 16 September 1968 were enveloped and left isolated in Owerri 
town by the Biafrans. 
The seal off was so complete that even another rescue brigade dispatched from Port Harcourt to break the codon 
in other to relieve the embattled 16 Brigade failed, as the meticulous Kalu had stopped them at Ohuba, some 9 
miles from Owerri. The situation in Owerri was so bad that Colonel Utuk had to call for air drops, for supply of 
arms and ammunition and other essentials such as food and uniforms. That however did not improve the 
situation because they never got upto ten percent of the total drops.
50
 Any Biafran unit around Owerri which 
wanted something dropped by the Federal air force, only needed to clear a bit of bush, spread a white sheet of 
cloth over the clearing, and he would get a drop
51
. This was because the Biafran Directorate of Military 
Intelligence intercepted the conversation between the encircled Colonel Utuk and the Nigerian air force where 
upon he was counseled to mark out areas for the drops by spreading white sheets with some red markings in the 
centre.
52
 Although due to inefficiency in the air drop operations, most of the weapons dropped were badly 
damaged and was of little use. But the gun powder extracted from the damaged weapons was used by the Biafran 
BOFF and members of the army who were in 14 Division at least for the time the food dropping lasted were able 
to feed well.
53
 
However, on the evening of 22 April, Lt. Col. Utuk held a meeting with his battalion commanders. It was 
decided that despite orders from Colonel Adekunle in Port Harcourt to stay put, they would instead pull out.
54
 
On 24
th
 of April 1969, the stressed troops of the 16 Brigade led by Colonel Utuk managed to tactically withdrew 
in the night with what remained of his Brigade and joined another unit of 3 Marine Commando at Amunelu, 
about 23 miles south of Owerribut his second in command, MajorTed Hammanwas killed in an ambush 
atOwerri. Meanwhile, the moving away of the men of 16 Brigade led by Lt. Col. Utuk was not unknown to the 
Biafran army. When it was noticed that the Brigade lined up their vehicles facing southwards, in a manner 
suggesting withdrawal, the Biafran army commanders in Owerri operation like Major Igweze, Col. 
Onwuatuegwu and Maj. Gen Madiebo decided that it was better to allow the Nigerian forces to leave the town 
and then attack from somewhere outside Owerri to avoid waste of ammunitions which were in short supply in 
Biafra. As a result, the Biafran 60 Brigade was dispatched to Umuguma to wait for the retreating 16 Brigade. 
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Major battle started at Umuguma on the morning of 25
th
 April and up to Avu and Ohoba when the few remaining 
men of 16 Brigade led by Utuk joined other Nigerian troops after Ohoba.
55
 
In warfare, the inability to rescue isolated troop held in enemy territory has the capacity of throwing both the 
military and the political class into disorientation. The eventual withdrawal of the encircled 16
th
 Brigade 
commanded by Lt. Col. Utuk from Owerri brought relief to the Federal military and political class but also 
marked the complete recapture of Oweri by the Biafran forces.Therefore, the tactical withdrawal of the 
enveloped Federal forces from Owerri and the total recapture of the town had consequences to both Biafrans and 
the Federal Governments.  On the Biafran side, it sent a signal to Nigeria and the world that despite all the 
reverses of the war to date, Biafra was still capable of significant resistance. It destroyed the myth surrounding 
the federal 3
rd
 Marine Commando Division and its well-known commander, Colonel BenjaminAdekunle, a.k.a. 
“Black Scorpion”.  It enhanced road and telecommunications links within the enclave of Biafra. It relieved the 
threat to the strategic Uli-Ihiala airstrip. It also created a hinge point for subsequent aggressive Biafran probes 
towards Port Harcourt.
56
 
According to Madiebo: The Owerri victory revived the dying Biafra.  All Biafrans who a few days before 
wanted nothing but an end to the war, now pressed for a continuation of the struggle to the end.  The Umuahia 
disaster was soon forgotten and the only quarrel civilian military tacticians had against the Army was that they 
allowed the enemy to escape from Owerri. The enemy left a considerably large amount of ammunition of 
different calibres, but he managed to take away almost his entire heavy equipment including armoured vehicles 
and artillery pieces.  The town was completely ravaged and not a single building was habitable without major 
repairs.  All vehicles not taken away by the enemy were overturned and burnt by him.  Mass graves were 
discovered all over the town and the victims appeared to be civilians and prisoners of war….the head of state put 
out a long list of promotions to commemorate the recapture of Owerri.”57 
On the Nigerian side, it led to preparation by the Army Headquarters of new Operational instructions, 
dated 9 May 1969, for the reactivation of progress in the war effort and at the war fronts. 
Although no official casualty count has ever been rendered, but if Major General Shuwa’s estimate is 
correct, then it can be surmised that of the approximately 3000 soldiers that confidently thundered into 
the town in September 1968, about 300 made it back alive in April 1969.
58
Although this had a negative 
consequence, it forced the army Headquarters to make a change in the command of the 3MCDO which 
eventually led to the victory of the Federal army. 
 To revive the morale of Commandos, Colonel Adekunle was replaced by Colonel Obasanjo on May 16 
1969.
59
According to Obasanjo, 
The Moral of the soldiers at least of 3 Marine Commando Division was at 
its lowest ebb. Desertion and absence from duty without leave was rife in 
the Division. The despondence and general lack of will to fight in the 
soldiers was glaringly manifest in the large numbers of cases of self-
inflicted injuries throughout the formation. Some officers tactically 
encouraged these malpractices and unsoldierly conduct by condoning such 
acts or withdrawing their own kith and kin or fellow tribesmen to do guard 
duties in the rear and in the officers’ own houses. Distrust and lack of 
confidence plagued the ranks of the officer corps. Operations were 
unhealthily competitive in an unmilitary fashion and officers openly 
rejoiced at each other’s misfortune.60 
And as was expected, Obasanjo revived what was left in the 3MCDO. He paid them their salaries and paid 
greater interest in their welfare.
61
 Before his time, the soldiers of 3MCDO could not get leave at all and could not 
get their salaries in full. Although the idea of paying soldiers their full salary has been questioned by another 
author, Alabi-Isama, it may have served a purpose at that time in the lives of 3MCDO. But despite Col. 
Obasanjo’s effort in adopting measures that would upswing the fighting morals of the men and officers of the 
3MCDO, his first war plans against Owerri also ended in fiasco. The first thing he did was to ask Lt. Col. 
Godwin Ally to produce for implementation within forty eight hours a written appreciation on paper for an attack 
on Ohoba, fifteen miles from Owerri. According to him “the aim was to hit the rebels as close to their base as 
possible so that they would stop ofwithdrawfrom their southward thrust on Port Harcourt.”62 The attack was led 
by the I sector of the 3MCDO on  20
th
 May, 1969 and in just one hour battle 3MCDO lost about 1,000 troops.
63
 
After the battle, and despite series of attempts, the Federal forces did not conquerOwerri again until 9
th
 January 
1970.   
 
 
Historical Research Letter                                                                                                                                      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3178 (Paper)  ISSN 2225-0964 (Online) 
Vol 9, 2014 
 
31 
The use of Mercenaries in Owerri battle     
It is true that mercenaries were used by both the Federal and Biafran forces in the civil war however, available 
evidence would tend to suggest that there was minimal use of mercenary in the army in Owerri sector. The bulk 
of the mercenaries were in the air force than other forces.  On the Biafran side in the Owerri sector, mercenaries 
formed and fought as commandos. In the Biafran context, Mercenary was synonymous with 
Commando.
64
However, while it is uncontestable that mercenaries were used by the Biafrans during the war, the 
role of the mercenaries (Commandos) was very minimal in Owerrisector partly because as at the time the Owerri 
battle was on, the Biafran government and the army had fallen apart with their mercenaries. In fact in 1969 the 
Commando was reorganized and the Biafran officers took over.
65
 As a result of frequent disagreement between 
the Biafran army and the mercenaries, they were forced to leave Biafra. When one of the mercenaries, Major 
Steiner, from Germany
66
 left Biafra, the remaining of his group left before the war ended. The bunch of white 
men who remained in Biafra till the last week of the war were those styled Technical Adviser and they were 
never involved in combat, their role was purely advisory.
67 
On the Nigerian side, there is no known record of the role of the mercenaries in Owerri sector. However, since it 
was said that most of the Nigerian war jets were piloted by foreigners especially Egyptians, it was not impossible 
that it was the Nigerian air-force mercenaries that piloted the planes that bombarded Owerri.
68
 
However despite the minimal participation of the mercenaries in Owerri sector, their presence was observed.  On 
the Bifran side, in July 1968 the Commandos moved from Onitsha to Owerri sector, and a Mercenary called 
Johnny Erasmus, a wizard in the handling of explosives, went to work and planted mines and foot cutters that 
dealt with the advancing Federal forces from Port Harcourt to Owerri. But it was not long before the 
Commandos were moved again.
69
 
The air force in Owerri sector of the civil war 
The air force played a significant role in the Owerri battle. On the Nigerian side during Owerri battle, the Federal 
air attacks were stepped up. The Russian Ilyushin-28 bombers had joined the MiG and Dulphin fighters in the 
ongoing bombardment. Markets, hospitals, churches, villages and other non-military targets were 
indiscriminately strafed and bombed killing large numbers of civilians.
70
Most inhabitants of Owerri moved into 
the surrounding villages to take cover from the Nigerian air attacks.
71
 As usual this constant bombing of civilian 
targets had the opposite effect to the one intended: it stiffened rather than undermined popular support for the 
war in Biafra and added substance to the fear of genocide. When the 16 Brigade of the Nigerian army under the 
command of Colonel Utuk was enveloped in Owerri, Utuk contacted the air force for the dropping of food, 
weapons and other logistics for the war. 
On the Biafran side, the Biafranair force which had been knocked out of operation by the superior Nigerian Air 
Force dramatically bounced back and made dramatic re-entry into the war in 1969 with their newly acquired 
“Minicon” air crafts. These Minicons performed extremely well against selected strategic targets. The Minicons 
were light aircrafts of extremely maneuverable type fitted with rockets and bombs. They flew at tree-top level to 
destroy the Nigerian MiGs and Ilyushins on ground. Escape was achieved by element of surprise and the low 
altitude of the planes painted green on top, and blueunderneath. They flew scarcely above the tops of the palm 
trees and were mostly undetectable until they struck and largely impossible to follow afterwards. Count Von 
Rosen played a commendable rolein the operation of these small air crafts which he nick-named “Biafran 
Babies”. By 1969, there were 15 Minicons operating in Biafra.72 
Biafrans in the Owerri battle 
Unlike in some other sectors especially the southern sector of the civil war where the Biafran forces claimed that 
they lost due largely to sabotage and questionable cum minimal or lack of cooperation of the natives. Owerri was 
a core Biafran city where loyalty to Biafran state was less in doubt. Both the military and the civil population 
were committed in the war. Again due to experience of the past, every Biafran both the military and the civilians 
never wanted to be seen as anti Biafran as a result of the bitter consequence it carries. It is said that the people of 
Biafra never wasted time in dealing with any person accused of sabotage. At times even the army attacked their 
officers suspected of sabotage without the orders of the army headquarters. For instance, the Biafran Science 
Group could not completely move their chemicals, unused grenades, rocket and bomb casings at the fall of 
Enugu for fear of being lynched by over-zealous civilians who could mistake them for saboteurs.
73
 In Owerri 
sector therefore, there was no known record or account of sabotage. In addition, the Federal forces were initially 
afraid of entering the Igbo heartland where they could hardly have native collaborators. Brigadier Alabi-Isama 
put it thus, “looking at the map, we realized that the piecemeal attack and advance into Ibo heartland would be 
suicidal. Everybody kept away unless he was called or ordered”74 
Furthermore, there was remarkable increase in availability of weapons in the sector. Although there is no definite 
account of the weapons used in the battle of Owerri but in addition to other conventional weapons of war, in this 
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Owerri battle, the Biafran Head of State issued“the following ammunition for all troops taking part for the first 
one week of the operation-50,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. 200 rounds of 105 mm artillery shells, 300 
rounds of mortar bombs, 20 rounds of anti-tank rockets, grenades and other smaller items”.75Later he made 
available 960 bolt action guns 
76
in addition to other locally made weapons of war. Again the two armored 
vehicles operating in Biafra named “Corporal Nwafor” and “Oguta boy”77were used in this sector. The newly 
invented “flying ogbunigwe” (flying rockets) and foot cutter were used in Owerri sector. As AchikeUdenwa put 
it, “our ogbunigwewas very effective in checking enemy advance78. Commenting on the use of ogbunigwe not 
only in Owerri but in other sectors of the war, The News, a newspaper on the American secret files in the war 
which was quoting Chinua Achebe and Vincent Chukwemeka maintains that“ ogbunigwe bombs struck great 
terror in the hearts of many a Nigerian soldier and were used to great effect by the Biafran army throughout the 
conflict…when the history of this war comes to be written, the ogbunigwe and the shore batteries will receive 
special mention as Biafra’s greatest saviours. We have been able to wipe out more Nigerians with ogbunigwe 
than with any imported weapon.”79 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Owerri sector of the civil war appeared to be one of the bitterest battle zones in the war. The two warring 
factions demonstrated their military superiority over each other and that resulted in the change of hands of 
Owerri between the Federal and the Biafran army up to three times. The recapture of Owerri by the Biafrans 
reinvigorated the already waning Biafran’s fighting spirit so much so that in the meeting of the Biafran military 
and civilian leaders on 5
th
 of January 1970, Major General Alexander Madiebo the Biafran army commander, 
assured the leaders that if given more arms and ammunition, he would turn the table on Nigerians in less than 
one month. But despite the optimism of the Biafran army, the revitalized 3MCDO led by Colonel Obasanjo 
recaptured Owerri on 9
th
 January and the Biafran leader, General OdumegwuOjukwu left the country on 10
th
 
January 1970 and the war formerly came to an end on the 15
th
of January 1970.  
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